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"Brains are as diverse as palates."
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I. INTRODUCTION
Free speech issues can be approached on several different levels.
One familiar approach focuses on the most basic reasons for protecting
freedom of speech in the first place. Another, a more particularized
approach, focuses on the judicial tests used to resolve specific kinds of
free speech cases. There is, however, a large and important, if
underexplored, middle range between these two extremes. This Article
explores the value of "mid-range" free speech theory and focuses on the
degree of diversity of speech perspectives that is realistically available to
the public. This Article will argue that expanding the diversity of voices
realistically available generally reduces some important political risks,
including the risks of committing serious errors of public policy, as well
as failing to recognize or acknowledge, and then correct, those errors. In
the area of free speech and in various other contexts, diversity and risk-
reduction go hand in hand.
To begin, the focus on diversity should be situated more clearly
between the most basic kinds of approaches to free speech on the one
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hand, and the more particularized approach focusing on specific judicial
free speech tests on the other. Consider, first, the most basic approaches
to freedom of speech. A number of possible reasons exist for deciding a
free speech case one way or another. These reasons may be
distinguished between so-called speech value reasons and non-speech
value reasons. Non-speech value reasons often track broader, parallel
reasons for deciding constitutional cases in general. For example, just as
courts might rely on established case law precedent when deciding
constitutional cases in general,' they might also rely on prior free speech
case law when deciding a current free speech case,2 regardless of the
method used by the court in that precedent case. Alternatively, courts
might try to decide a free speech case-by determining the relevant intent
of the Framers or ratifiers of the free speech clause.3 This would parallel
the broader attempt to resolve constitutional cases more generally by
reference to original intent.4 This approach to interpreting the free
speech clause and the Constitution more broadly would not necessarily
refer directly to any values thought to underpin the free speech clause or
the Constitution itself.
The limitations of relying on non-speech value reasons for deciding
free speech cases have long been clear. Relying on prior free speech
cases as precedent, for example, leaves open the question of how to
validate the earliest link in the precedential chain. Even if it is claimed
that free speech precedents have always been available, some way to
determine whether one prior free speech case is "closer" and more
relevant than another is needed.5 It is difficult to convincingly resolve
I See Symposium, Judicial Decisionmaking: The Role of Text, Precedent, and the Rule of Law, 17
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 23 (1994); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991); Symposium, The Crisis in Legal
Theory and the Revival of Classical Jurisprudence, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401 (1988).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,317-21 (1990) (discussing and relying on
prior flag burning case precedent of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
3 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
583 (1983) ("There is substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have
troubled the Framers of the First Amendment."). But cf. id. at 583 n.6 ("It is true that our
opinions rarely speculate on precisely how the Framers would have analyzed a given
regulation of expression. In general, though, we have only limited evidence of exactly how
the Framers intended the First Amendment to apply. There are no recorded debates in the
Senate or in the States .... ").
4 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the Framers' original intent regarding the Fourth Amendment); see
also Antonin Scalia, Originalisn: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
5 In such cases, it will be difficult to choose among different, and perhaps conflicting,
precedents without making some reference to legal principles and policies. See, e.g., HENRY
1999] DOMINANCE AND DIVERSITY 3
these problems without referring to possible values underlying the free
speech clause.6
Several speech value reasons are commonly cited for deciding free
speech cases one way rather than another. A number of such values,
purposes, or goals are thought to inspire the free speech clause. Some
free speech values are directly political, and others less so. Among the
more directly political free speech values are those of promoting
democratic self-government, 7 imposing a check on governmental
misrule,8 promoting political change,9 protecting dissent, 10 and balancing
political stability and political change." Among the less directly
political, or at least broader, free speech values are those of self-
realization or autonomy,12 tolerance, 13 and the search for truth, 14 in
politics and in other arenas, through a marketplace of ideas.15
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 396 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment:
Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1990) (discussing free speech as linked
to democratic legitimacy) [hereinafter Blasi, Learned Hand].
8 See, e.g., Blasi, Learned Hand, supra note 7, at 12; Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119,142 (1989).
9 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 S. CAL L. REV. 293 (1982).
10 See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 86-109
(1990).
11 See, e.g., THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
12 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-140 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1974) (1859); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982);
Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443,
446-47 (1998); Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 142-45; Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 204 (1972).
13 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SocIETY (1986); Vincent Blasi, The Teaching
Function of the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1987) (reviewing LEE C. BOLLINGER,
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986)) [hereinafter Blasi, Teaching Function].
14 See MILL, supra note 12, at 74-140; JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION
(George H. Sabine ed., Appleton-Century-Crafts 1951) (1644); Greenawalt, supra note 8, at
130-41; Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 649, 715 (1987) (summarizing the argument regarding voluntary true beliefs,
"biographical" truths, and tolerance); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth
as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing without a reliance on
"transcendent" truth). For a helpful discussion of John Milton's classic work, see Vincent
Blasi, John Milton's Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment, 13 COMM. LAW. 1 (1996).
For an argument prefiguring Milton, see THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 119 (Paul Turner trans.,
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Not everyone accepts all of these free speech values, or even
considers them all equally fundamental. 6  Even if one were to
convincingly pare down the above list of free speech values, however, a
basic problem would remain. Often, it seems that legitimate free speech
values appear on opposite sides of an interesting and important free
speech case,17 or that the very same free speech value seems to appear on
opposite sides of the case.' 8 It is often not clear how best to acknowledge
any of the free speech values, let alone properly accommodate more than
one such value.
This Article does not wish to reduce the list of possible free speech
values,19 to assign them permanent, specific weights or boundaries,20 or
Penguin 1965) (1516) ("Mruth would eventually prevail of its own accord-as long as the
matter was discussed calmly and reasonably.").
15 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). But cf.
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.]. 1.
16 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 12, at 593 (labeling individual self-realization as the single
true basic free speech value). For critiques of free speech theories that seek to reduce the
apparent plurality of free speech values to some single primary value, see Greenawalt,
supra note 8, at 125-26; Blasi, Teaching Function, supra note 13, at 407-08 (stating Bollinger's
theory underplays the free speech values of political "participation and the checking of
power"); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1137, 1142-43 (1983). For a critique of free speech value theory more generally, see
Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First
Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L REV. 1405,1422-23 (1987). For slightly variant compilations
of the most commonly cited free speech values, see EMERSON, supra note 11, at 6-7; Edward
J. Bloustein, The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by Freedom
of Expression, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 372-73 (1982) (citing Emerson); Redish, supra note 12, at
591 (citing Emerson); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression.and the Civic
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL L REV. 267,
272-73 (1991); Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1,4 (1989).
17 Given the expressive interests, and in particular the autonomy interests at stake on both
sides, this might be said of many hecklers veto, captive audience, fighting words, or hate
speech cases. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False
Empathy, 94 CAL. L. REv. 61, 82 (1996) (discussing hate speech as tending to silence, as
opposed to encouraging (further) debate). Herein, we shall see a similar general
phenomenon at work in the campaign funding case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam), the mandatory student fee case of Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.),
petition for reh'g en banc denied, 157 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom., Board of
Regents v. Southworth, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999), and the public television congressional
candidate debate case of Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
For a discussion of Forbes and the diversity of electoral speech, see infra Section V.
18 Consider, for example, the potential role of the free speech value of autonomy on both
sides, though certainly in different ways, in the.cases cited at supra note 17.
19 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
2D For a discussion of some problems of absolutism, weight, balancing, and
commensurability in the free speech context, see R. George Wright, Does Free Speech
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even to add other free speech values into the mix. Enough attention has
elsewhere been paid to identifying allegedly fundamental values
underlying the free speech clause. In contrast, more work needs to be
done at what might be called the second-order level. Free speech theory
at the second-order level is between the "deep" theory of basic free
speech values and the more particularized level of specific judicial free
speech tests. More work at the second-order level might help resolve
free speech cases more satisfyingly,21 or at least more candidly, and
might help to reassess the various specific judicial free speech tests and
standards currently employed.22
In particular, this Article will discuss the idea of diversity, or its
cognate in some contexts, diversification, as a second-order free speech
value. It does not seek to add diversity or diversification as a rival
fundamental free speech value. Nor is diversity, or diversification, itself
a particular test to be judicially applied in some appropriate context.23
Instead, diversity is thought of as a second-order value that can be used
to critique specific judicial tests. Diversity can also be readily linked to
free speech itself, to one or more of the fundamental free speech values,
and to the important general value of risk reduction, in various contexts.
However paradoxical it may initially seem, results in some activity
can often be improved by reducing one's subjective attention to that
Jurisprudence Rest on a Mistake?: Implications of the Commensurability Debate, 23 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 763 (1990).
21 For an example of a useful contribution along these general lines, see Vincent Blasi, The
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1985)
(stating that free speech jurisprudence should be oriented toward maximizing its
usefulness during the most intolerant, repressive historical periods). For a critique, see
George C. Christie, Why the First Amendment Should Not Be Interpreted from the Pathological
Perspective: A Response to Professor Blasi, 1986 DUKE L.J. 683, 688-89 (rejecting strategic
considerations in individual judicial decisionmaking, as well as the idea of a recognizable
(political) "core" of the freedom of speech). For a response, see Vincent Blasi, The Role of
Strategic Reasoning in Constitutional Interpretation: In Defense of the Pathological Perspective,
1986 DUKE L.J. 696.
22 The Supreme Court has adopted at least minimally different multiple-part tests for free
speech in, for example, the specific areas of subversive advocacy, fighting words, prior
restraint, libel, commercial speech, obscenity, hate speech, public employee speech,
compelled affirmations, and speech in public fora. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 19-273 (1999).
23 Thus, just as diversification is not a proposed rival fundamental free speech value,
neither is it a particular single or multi-part judicial test to be employed in particular
speech contexts, as are the tests referred to at supra note 22. Neither is diversity a matter of
the relativity of truth. See, e.g., Steven Lukes, Moral Diversity and Relativism, 29 J. PHIL
EDUC. 173, 178 (1995) (critiquing "the relativist reaction" to moral diversity).
6 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
activity's ultimate values and increasing the focus on intermediate or
instrumental values. Consider an illustration. Suppose that a group of
golfers want to improve their golf game. Formulating this goal at too
high a level of generality is unlikely to be practically useful. While they
would not want to miss the forest for the trees, reminding themselves
that they merely want to play better or to score lower would likely not be
helpful from a practical standpoint. 24 The group could focus on what
might be called the fundamental values underlying successful golf,
including, but not limited to, power and accuracy in striking the ball.25
Concentrating on such fundamental values, however, is by itself of only
limited assistance.
More usefully, they will want to supplement their attention to, say,
the fundamental value of power itself with second-order, more
instrumental concerns. They will want to know about possible tradeoff
rates between power and accuracy. Further, they certainly will want
some general understanding of how best to generate power. This
intermediate level understanding, in turn, may help them to choose
among the various, more particular, maxims and bits of concrete advice
they receive, akin to the particularized free speech tests for various
specific contexts noted above.26
In the game of golf, ideas such as muscle strength and flexibility,
swing arc, torque, balance, weight. shift, and rhythm help mediate
between ultimate values, such as power, and more particularized
possible rules, such as the proper extent of one's shoulder turn, the
optimal grip, and moving or not moving one's head.27 By way of
analogy, in the free speech context, the idea of diversity, and particularly
diversification as a risk-reduction strategy, can usefully mediate between
the assumed fundamental values underlying freedom of speech and the
various narrow doctrinal tests that might be chosen to decide particular
cases.
It is possible, in theory, to develop so much confidence in one's
second-order values that one could then use such values to critique and
24 It is a matter of common experience, by the way, that there is not a perfect coincidence
between playing better and scoring lower. A golfer can play better one week, but score
higher, than the golfer's round the previous week.
25 For the classic authorities, see BEN HOGAN & HERBERT WARREN WIND, BEN HOGAN'S
FIvE LESSONS: THE MODERN FUNDAMENTALs OF GOLF (1985) and JACK NICKLAUS & KEN
BOWDEN, JACK NICKLAus' LESSON TEE (1992).
26 See supra note 22.
27 For discussion, see the authorities cited at supra note 25.
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revise the received list of more fundamental free speech values.28 This
Article does not undertake that task. Instead, this Article will focus on
expounding and defending the value of diversity in the free speech
context, in other legal contexts, and in non-legal contexts as well. This
Article will then illustrate how taking diversification and its risk-
reduction seriously, as a second-order value, casts critical light upon
some particularized free speech tests and doctrines and helps to resolve
some difficult current free speech problems. Bearing the idea of
diversity in mind when approaching free speech cases is both
theoretically justified and of value in resolving such cases.
This is not to suggest that diversity and its risk reduction is
invariably the decisive value, that it will always be easy to recognize
diversity when we see it, or that it is impossible for the value of diversity
itself, perhaps in different senses, to appear on both sides of a free speech
case. No intermediary value can resolve every imaginable problem. The
usefulness of focusing on diversity and risk reduction, however, can be
shown through the illustrations below, focusing especially on
participation in congressional candidate debates conducted on public
television 29 and on mandatory university student fee issues.3°
II. DIVERSITY IN THE CONTEXT OF SPEECH: SOME INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The idea of diversity, in the law and elsewhere, is not clear, unitary,
and unequivocal. 31 There is, however, an established sense in which the
idea of diversity is functionally crucial to the logic of free speech.
Recognizing the linkages among democracy and diversity of characters,
28 For a parallel argument that great confidence in the correctness of statutory and other
levels of case adjudication can properly shed light on the best understanding of even
"fundamental" level constitutional provisions, via a "coherentist" methodology, see R.
George Wright, Two Models ofConstitutional Adjudication, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1357 (1991). For
a broader discussion of a coherentist methodology patterned after the methodology
employed by John Rawls, see NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE
EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1996).
29 For a discussion of the diversity of speech and Forbes, see infra Section V.A.
30 For a discussion of Southworth v. Grebe and diversity of speech on university campuses,
see infra Section V.B.
31 See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The word 'diversity'... does
not admit of permanent, concrete definition."). See also Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation,
43 UCLA L. REv. 1839, 1849 (1996) ("Everybody talks about diversity, but no one knows
what it means."); Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and
Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 821-22 (1998) (same). But cf. Vince Herron,
Note, Increasing the Speech Diversity, Campus Speech Codes, and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. CAL.
L. REV. 407 (1994) (stating that difference, distinction, and dissimilarity are generally key to
diversity).
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lifestyles, tastes, and free speech goes back at least as far as Plato.32 This
recognition has been gradually developed in the modem era. For
example, while John Milton's taste for diversity had its limits,33 there is
also a recognition in Milton of the linkages among free speech, diversity,
and risk reduction. For example, Milton recognizes that "errors in a
good government and in a bad are almost equally incident; for what
magistrate may not be misinformed, and much the sooner, if liberty of
printing be reduced into the power of a few?"3m The many voices made
available to us through freedom of speech may thus promote the quicker
recognition and correction of governmental error, if they do not prevent
the error in the first place.
John Stuart Mill's appreciation of diversity was also not literally
boundless. Mill assumes that some experiments in living will fail as
others succeed, and that as humanity improves and progresses along the
path of self-perfection, there will naturally be more, and not less,
uniformity of opinion and belief.35 By analogy, there is today less, rather
than more, diversity over whether the earth is flat. Mill remains, of
course, a champion of great diversity of speech and lifestyle.36 In this,
Mill anticipates an important theme of twentieth century United States
free speech law.
Judge Learned Hand, for example, echoed Milton and Mill in his
understanding of free speech and diversity of perspective. Judge
Learned Hand argued in particular that the First Amendment"presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection."37 The Supreme Court has itself observed that "[t]he right to
32 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIc OF PLATO 285-86 (Francis M. Comford trans., 1945).
3 See MILTON, supra note 14, at 52 (limiting the scope of free speech).
Id. at 56. A generation later, Spinoza argued that "men thinking in diverse and
contradictory fashions cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled to speak only
according to the dictates of the supreme power." BENEDICr DE SPINOZA, A Theologico-
Political Treatise, in I THE CHIEF WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA 258 (R.H.M. Elwes trans.,
Gordon Bell and Sons 1951) (1670).
35 See MILL, supra note 12, at 106 ("As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which
are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase ... ").
36 See, e.g., id. at 108, 121 (referring to the advantages of "diversity of opinion" and
expounding the argument of Wilhelm von Humboldt that originality and development
require "freedom and variety of situations," leading to "individual vigour and manifold
diversity.").
37 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater
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speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is... one of
the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes."38 On
more than one occasion, the Court has concluded that the First
Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public ...."39
Diversity in the sense of a "multitude of tongues" is not only an
affirmatively good concept, but the absence of diversity in this sense is a
bad, or at least a risky or dangerous concept.40 Freedom of speech has in
large measure been a response to our sense of individual limitations,
partiality, narrowness, and fallibility.41  Individually, and in
homogeneous groups, society is given to one-sidedness, to exaggeration,
and to error. Free speech has thus reflected a "principle of
epistemological humility" 42 that is conscious of the risk of error, and
seeks to avoid political unfairness in bearing the burdens of the risk of
such errors.43 Political history is largely a matter of errors in political
judgment, and of slow, suppressed, or perhaps only partly successful
attempts to correct such errors. The optimal political state of affairs is
something approachable, but it is hardly something that is immediately
recognizable. If political errors are recognized, admitted, and corrected,
it is often, only after a slow and unnecessarily painful process. Diversity
of speech, in expanding the practically available range of possible
diagnoses and solutions, can reduce these costs.
This Article shall take up the value of diversity in several contexts
below, in which it will emphasize the "defensive" role of diversity in
reducing the risk of various sorts of undesirable outcomes. As it turns
Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914,928 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
38 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (quoting Ashton v Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195,
199 (1966)). Presumably, the Court here means to emphasize the value of diversity itself,
and not merely the specific right to promote diversity in particular, as a literal reading
might suggest.
39 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180,192 (1997), First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765,790 n.29 (1978); Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
40 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41 In this, modern free speech law has followed Milton and Mill. See MILTON, supra note
15, at 56; MILL, supra note 12, at 77-78 (stating that "[a]ll silencing of discussion is an
assumption of infallibility" and "ages are no more infallible than individuals.").
42 Redish & Lippman, supra note 16, at 281.
4 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 971,984 (1995).
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out, diversity offers the possibility of important risk-reduction not only
in the context of speech and political decisionmaking, but in other
instructive contexts as well.
Ill. THE MANY CONTEXTS OF DIVERSITY: SOME USEFUL LESSONS
A. The Analogy of Investment Diversification
In a number of contexts, some sort of diversity, or its cognate,
diversification, is widely credited with reducing unnecessary and
undesired risks of various sorts. Certainly, this does not amount to an
exceptionless pattern across all possible contexts. There are exceptions.
In the field of military strategy, for example, concentration 44 as opposed
to dispersion4s of one's own forces is generally, though not invariably,
considered a good thing.46
Diversity in the field of business and economics, on the other hand,
receives generally more favorable notices, though admittedly not in all
circumstances or for all purposes. Corporate diversification in various
respects is occasionally touted,47 but there is no well-established
understanding that corporations should, for example, ordinarily have
interests in a wide variety of different products.48 On the other hand, the
4 See, e.g., SUN TZu, THE ART OF WAR 98 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1963) ("If I am able to
determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own then I can
concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire
strength to attack a fraction of his."); CARL VON CLAUSEWrrz, ON WAR 276 (Anatol
Rapoport ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1832) (referring to the "imperative" strategic law "to
keep the forces concentrated.").
45 See, e.g., B.F. LIDDELL HART, STRATEGY 332-33 (2d rev. ed., 1991) (discussing the modem
development of the "dispersed strategic advance," under which "advancing forces
should.., be dispersed as much as is compatible with cohesion.").
46 Certainly, there is no suggestion that sound military strategy counsels putting all of
one's eggs typically in one basket, or relying excessively on any given technique or
weapons system, to the exclusion of others. The costs in predictability, inflexibility, and
inability to adapt are obvious. And there is, as well, obvious logic in dispersing military
assets one expects, for example, to come under aerial bombardment. See, e.g., Bradley
Graham, Skies Clear, NATO Rains Bombs; Clinton Vows Relentless Attack, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,
1999, at A01.
47 See, e.g., John Byrd, et al., Diversification: A Broader Perspective, 40 Bus. HORIZONS, Mar.-
Apr. 1997, at 40 (referring to diversity not only of a corporation's products, but of
shareholders, supplies, plant equipment, customers, and geopolitical influences as well).
48 See id. Underperforming lines or divisions may wind up being subsidized by betterperformers under the corporate umbrella. Id. The benefits of diversification in such cases
may also be outweighed by the extra difficulty in one management team's running diverse
businesses efficiently. See A Survey of Corporate Risk Management: Too Hot to Handle?-The
Art of Risk Spreading, 338 ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 516. This problem, of course, simply
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very idea of profitable corporate specialization implies that other,
separate corporations are doing many other, perhaps complementary,
things, which really amounts to a form of diversity at a higher level.49
In the narrower area of investment strategy, diversification is more
unequivocally embraced. Diversification permits the reduction of some
important risks.50 While the logic of not putting all of one's investment
eggs in one basket has long been appreciated,51 the mathematics of
investment portfolio diversification is a more recent development.5 2 The
logic of portfolio diversification has been broadly endorsed across the
law, in trusts,53 pensions, 4 and other fiduciary decisionmaking areas.55
As it turns out, a carefully selected investment portfolio can be less
risky than any single one of its individual investment components.5 6 The
goal is to find investments that tend not to vary together in their value,
and that are indeed negatively correlated, if not perfectly negatively
correlated.57 It is often thought, for example, that gold stocks tend to be
only weakly correlated, if not negatively correlated, with the movement
of a broader market basket of stocks in general.58
Such an investment risk-reduction strategy offers, by way of
analogy, some lessons for free speech policy. Freedom of speech may be
does not occur in the free speech context, where we do not expect any particular person or
group to itself understand and apply all policy critiques without any assistance from
outsiders. Knowledge in a democracy can and should be decentralized.
49 See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 8-9 (Edwin Canan ed., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1976) (1904).
so See, e.g., BURTON J. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 223-24 (1990). Risk
in this context refers to something like the degree of "the variance or standard deviation of
returns." Id. at 217.
51 See id. at 223.
52 See id. at 223-24. For some relevant mathematics, see Harry Markowitz, Portfolio
Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). Markowitz holds that "a rule of behavior which does not imply
the superiority of diversification must be rejected both as a hypothesis and as a maxim."
Id.
53 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 646 (1996) (referring to the 1992 revision of the RESTATEMENT
OF TRUSTS); Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, The New Prudent Investor Rule and the
Modern Portfolio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 39,52 (1996) (same).
54 See Langbein, supra note 53, at 646 (referring to 1974 federal ERISA statute).
55 See id.; Aalberts & Poon, supra note 53, at 52.
56 See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 50, at 226.
57 See id. at 225-27.
ms See id. at 226. More loosely, we can imagine that in a given city, there may be a negative
correlation between sales of rain hats and of sun block, or of portable fans and space
heaters, on any given day.
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at its optimal not merely when many people are talking and listening,
but when the potential diversity of the messages delivered is preserved
and encouraged. When different perspectives are encouraged from a
variety of speakers, unnecessary social risks, including unnecessary
delays in detecting and correcting political mistakes, may be reduced. In
particular, the expression of either of two negatively correlated
perspectives should not unnecessarily be discouraged. If one view tends
to seem most persuasive when another view seems least persuasive, and
vice versa, unnecessary social risks may be reduced by encouraging the
expression of both views.
Just as a selected pair of investments may reciprocally offset some of
each individual investment's riskiness, so a pair of separate ideas may
offset the risks, limitations, one-sidedness, or other disadvantages of
either idea by itself. A crucial disanalogy, however, must be pointed out.
In the investment field, a careful analysis may uncontroversially reveal
which investments, historically, have a mutually negative correlation.
Further study may suggest some reasons why this negative correlation
may continue into the future.59 One can consciously craft an investment
portfolio on this basis. Feedback, in the form of the actual performance
of this type of portfolio, is ongoing, clear, and unequivocal. In contrast,
however, one should distrust most government attempts to consciously
craft a limited "portfolio" of supposedly mutually offsetting or mutually
correcting ideas, with an eye toward reducing various social risks.
Allowing a government to identify a set of potentially valuable ideas to
serve as a corrective to its own possible errors would simply reraise the
problem of governmental bias and fallibility.
Plainly, one would not trust a government's judgment when
determining the primary long-term social risks associated with its own
policies.6° One would not trust a government's judgment as to the
degree to which those risks can or should be offset.61 Either would one
trust a government's judgment as to which ideas, critical of the
government's own policies, are the most persuasive or the best at
reducing any risks of the current government policy. 62 One might well
- It is, for example, not difficult to imagine why portable fan sales will tend to negatively
correlate with space heater sales over some short time frame, even given any reasonable
price reductions or price increases in view of anticipated demand.
60 A related logic is developed at length in Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
61 See id.
62 See id.
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expect, instead, a certain tunnel vision or other ideological bias on the
part of a government in power. A government may see only a fairly
narrow range of plausible alternative policies, with its own current
policies at the ideological center. Other alternatives are thought
impractical, or themselves one-sided. Similarly, a government may
irrationally undervalue, or exaggerate its differences with, what the rest
of the world sees as rather closely related alternative policies.
In any event, one would be rightly reluctant to trust a government to
choose a portfolio of contrasting ideas to balance the risks of its own
policies. Nor would one trust any other centralized decisionmaker, or
any popularly elected body, to select or revise such a supposedly
optimal portfolio of ideas. A long and unpleasant history of ill-judged
governmental repression and myopia suggests that as a rule, one is
better off with a broad range of ideas, however currently plausible or
implausible, that is not screened or filtered by any authoritative
governmental evaluation process. 63
Our portfolio of ideas, largely the current survivors of the
competition of the marketplace, 64 should thus generally not be subject to
further winnowing by the government. That "marketplace" may already
reflect a good deal of governmental influence, and may already be biased
against unfamiliar ideas. The investment portfolio analogy, however,
raises a further problem. Investment diversification does not require an
enormous number of particular investments.65 Could it be prudent,
therefore to believe that social risk reduction requires only a certain
limited number of alternative ideas, and that any diversity of ideas
beyond that point adds little further risk-reduction?
Assuming that additional diversity of ideas beyond some chosen
point will add little further risk-reduction is both a dangerous and
typically unwarranted practice. The same epistemic humility that
63 This is not to suggest that ideas cannot be subject to bigoted repression by private
action, apart from government sanction. See MILL, supra note 12, at 67. Rather, the point is
that ideas should not, in addition, be subjected to this sort of value assessment by the
government as well. Certainly, there is no obvious reason to believe that popular
governments will tend to revive and legitimize ideas suppressed by private groups or
general public opinion.
64 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., Leslie P. Norton, Power of Concentration: Risk Aversion and Diversification Are
Overrated, Says a Money Manager, 78 BARROW'S, Apr. 27, 1998, at 40 (discussing a situation
where a particular money manager opts for a mutual fund composition in which ten stocks
may make up as much as 45% of the overall portfolio).
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underlies free speech law in general suggests that one would not assume
that a government understands the nature and degree of all the risks of
all of its policies, or how much speech of what kind is necessary to
optimally reduce those risks.66 One can, instead, well imagine that
governments tend to underestimate the risks of their policies, and to
understate the ideal range and amount of speech critical of those
policies.67
The risks of a general governmental policy, especially over the long
term, are likely to be much more multidimensional and more difficult to
clearly envision and quantify than the risks of typical investments. For
example, among the risks of fighting the Vietnam War in a particular
way may be that public attitudes not only about military involvement,
but also about government in general, may persist for many years. The
public's investment objectives, on the other hand, typically do not reach
quite the same level of complexity, uncertainty, and nonquantifiability.
This is not to suggest that the risk environment for investments is
simple in any absolute sense. It plainly is not. There is some overlap
between investment risks and government policy risks. The complexity
of investment risk helps to account for the fact that optimal portfolio
diversification may require dozens or even hundreds of particular
investments.6 8 Even assuming that the risks of political and social
decisionmaking are no more complex than those of investments, a good
deal of diversity in the marketplace of ideas already seems required by
this analogy. Dozens or even hundreds of critiques may not suffice to
appropriately reduce the risks of slow error recognition and correction of
any political regime. 69 Such a number of critiques of any government or
general government policy would nevertheless involve a great deal of
diversity of speech.
Bearing in mind that the best risk-reducing portfolios involve
investments, or in the analogous case, ideas, that are only weakly
66 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 53, at 648-49 ("Although much of the benefits of
diversification can be achieved with a carefully selected smaller portfolio, optimal
diversification probably requires a portfolio containing hundreds of issues.").
6 Let us bear in mind, though, that American presidential and congressional elections
rarely involve more than two to four candidates deemed "serious." See Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam) (discussing typical congressional and presidential campaign scenarios).
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correlated, or even negatively correlated, with one another,70 one begins
to appreciate that a great amount of diversity can be involved in dozens
or hundreds of critiques of a given general policy. Dozens of different
critiques, uncorrelated or negatively correlated, along different
dimensions of a given governmental policy would give quite a bit of
diversity, and would give a basis for avoiding excessive "investment," or
excessively long investment, in that policy. It is far from clear that under
the current political regime, the general public has, even in a cybernetic
era, realistic access to anything like several dozen uncorrelated critiques
of even the most crucial government policies.71
It would, for this reason alone, be implausible for a government to
argue that its policy has been criticized in so many uncorrelated ways,
that one has already exhausted the benefits of diversity, and that
additional, different kinds of critique would add little or no further risk
reduction72 After all, to be of value, a critique need not itself be flawless.
However, when the institutional, ideological, and personal biases and
blinders of political decisionmakers are added in,73 it becomes especially
difficult to trust a government's judgment that further critiques of their
policies would add little further reduction of risk, and, therefore could be
safely suppressed. Left to their own judgment, most institutions may
genuinely perceive themselves as already rich in cultural and intellectual
diversity, even when, to an outsider, they are not. Governments surely
are not immune to this phenomenon of overestimating one's own
institutional diversity.
70 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
71 For a discussion of current media concentration, see infra notes 119-24 and
accompanying text. Consider also the limited number of media outlets in any given market
and the positive correlations in editorial positions on many issues adopted by the major
media. Whether developments in Internet technology will promote realistic access to
dozens of genuinely distinct perspectives on most issues is unclear. See infra notes 125-29.
One problem is that an apparent rich diversity of Internet voices may still reflect filtering
effects of the less richly diverse major media voices.
72 Note, by way of comparison, that even investment fund managers may be tempted to
cast aside achievable benefits of diversification by trying, however vainly, to outguess the
market by predicting which assets will perform best, thereby unbalancing their portfolio.
See, e.g., Augustin Hedberg, Diversiication; The Proven Way to Cut Risk and Protect Profits,
MONEY, Sept. 1,1988, at 62.
7 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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The investment portfolio analogy thus suggests that while any
government must inevitably make "bets" by adopting certain policies, 74
free speech requires that governments hedge those bets by tolerating the
expression of multiple, diverse, and potentially valuable critiques of
those policies. Hedging governmental policy bets via free speech
enables the society to more quickly appreciate and correct governmental
misjudgments, and to minimize the "groupthink" problem in collective
decisionmaking.75
This does not suggest that governments should in general avoid
risky substantive policies, or that the risk reduction effects of free and
diverse speech are so important that every other policy goal should be
sacrificed. 76 The hedging of bets may, in certain contexts, involve some
risks of its own.77 Nevertheless, it is also apparently the case that,
hedging one's bets in a broad problem-solving context by
simultaneously pursuing complementary solution strategies, 78 can
reduce both the risk of not reaching a solution9 and the average solution
time as well.80 Overall, the analogy to investment diversification
supports the view that free speech, as the unconstrained practical
74 See MILL, supra note 12, at 78 (recognizing that government must in the end adopt some
particular policy, amounting to a commitment to the belief that the policy will turn out for
the best).
75 For a concise discussion of hedging as a risk reduction strategy, see Lost in a Maze of
Hedges, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1992, at 84. For the related problem of insufficient genuine
diversity of perspective in formulating government policy, see IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF
GROUPrHINK (1972) (discussing the pathology of group decisionmaking in which the desire
for group cohesion and consensus begins to override the realistic evaluation of possible
alternative policies).
76 By analogy, the duty of investment diversification clearly does not imply that risk
should always be absolutely minimized, even at the probable loss of great gains. See
Aalberts & Poon, supra note 53, at 63 ("[T]he duty of care and caution does not imply that
the trustee should avoid as much risk as possible by investing trust assets solely in
securities like treasury bills, certificates of deposit, etc."). For a further, broader discussion
of risk aversion and expected utility maximization in the free speech context, see infra
Section VI.
77 See Gerrard Gennotte & Hayne Leland, Market Liquidity, Hedging and Crashes, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 999 (1990) (discussing how even relatively little hedging could help account for
stock market discontinuities or "crashes"). There are several ways of reducing the risk of
crashes in the presence of hedging. See id. at 1017. Hedging of bets or diversification in our
free speech context is of course a much less mutually interdependent, crash-inducing
phenomenon.
78 See Charles Seife, Hedging Bets on Hard Problems, SCIENCE, Jan. 3,1997, at 33.
79 See id.
8 Id.
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accessibility l of an indefinitely large number of distinct and varied
critiques of any given policy, reduces the risks of adopting and persisting
too long in any potentially defective public policy.
B. The Analogy of Biodiversity
Over the past several decades, there has been increasing scientific
and public policy interest in the idea of biodiversity.82  Biodiversity
includes "ecosystem or community diversity, species diversity, and
genetic diversity." 83  To some extent, biodiversity has been
authoritatively endorsed in current public policy through legislation
such as the Endangered Species Act. 84
There is an important functional analogy between biodiversity and
investment portfolio diversification, and between biodiversity and a risk
reduction approach to freedom of speech. The idea of complementarity
or negative correlation between investments, for example, is crucial to
optimal investment diversification.8 5 Similarly, the idea of
complementarity, or of differences. in their optimal conditions of
81 By itself, the value of reducing risks through diversification requires that these diverse
perspectives be genuinely, and not just somehow technically, available for actual public
endorsement or other use. Once any given critique is thus practically available, however,
the diversification value by itself does not tell us whether every single potential speaker
should have an opportunity to express her already widely disseminated and discussed
reasons for adopting or rejecting any given policy. The diversification value thus does not
say much about the extent of person G's rights to merely repeat what persons A-F have just
articulated. Allowing G to say her piece may, for example, be more important to G's
autonomy or self-realization than to any virtues of diversity. See supra note 12 (discussing
the free speech value of self-realization).
82 See, e.g., Oliver Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 869, 870 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(1997).
83 See Houck, supra note 82, at 874. The well-known zoologist Edward 0. Wilson defines
biodiversity as "all hereditarily based variation at all levels of organization, from the genes
within a single local population or species, to the species composing all or part of a local
community, and finally to the communities themselves that compose the living parts of the
multifarious ecosystems of the world." Edward 0. Wilson, Introduction, in BIODIvERsrrY 11:
UNDEESTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 1 (Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla
et al. eds., 1997). Biodiversity has also been more simply defined as "the presence of a large
number of species of animals and plants." Ruth Patrick, Biodiversity: Why Is It Important?,
in BIoDwERrY 1: UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 15
(Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla et al. eds., 1997). For further discussion, see, for example, John
Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Laving Fly, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 174 (1998).
-4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994). For relevant congressional findings, see 16 U.S.C. § 1531
(a) (1)-(5) (1994).95 See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
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performance, gives different constituents of the biosphere their
"insurance value"8 and their ability to contribute to the "resilience"87 of
the ecological system.88
In this respect, biodiversity is paralleled by our appreciation that for
every dominant ideology or idea, there are numerous possible
complementary ideas that might be pressed into service when the costs
of our currently dominant ideas seem to become too high. Even the best
ideas have some limits to their application. When such limits are
approached, the practical availability of diverse alternative ideas allows
one to more quickly mitigate the otherwise severe shocks to the political
system. The availability of alternative, unsuppressed ideas is thus, in the
political realm, a form of "disaster insurance."8
As it happens, neither the value of diverse speech nor of biodiversity
is entirely a matter of avoiding disaster. Biological diversity also offers
the raw materials of yet undeveloped "medicines, crops,
pharmaceuticals, timber, fibers, pulp, soil-restoring vegetation,
petroleum substitutes, and other products and amenities ....90
See Charles Perrings et al., Introduction: Framing the Problem of Biodiversity Loss, in
BIODIVERSITY: ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES 1, 4 (Charles Perrings et al. eds., 1995).
87 See id.
s Thus, Perrings argues that "[i]f wild grasses perform the same ecological functions as
domesticated grasses but under a different range of environmental conditions,... then
wild grasses have insurance value. They contribute towards the resilience of the system
before shocks and stresses that alter those environmental conditions." Id. See also National
Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Henderson, J.,
concurring) ("Some studies show... that the mere presence of diverse species within an
ecosystem (biodiversity) by itself contributes to the ecosystem's fecundity.").
89 To join the biological and the political, merely for the sake of an example, one is
doubtless better off discussing the costs, benefits, and possible range of magnitude of
global warming before and after one acts, one way or another, than one would be by either
authoritatively minimizing the phenomenon or treating it as dogma, regardless of any
future evidence on the subject. For background, see, for example, Charlotte Booncharoen &
John Gase, International Commitment Toward Curbing Global Warming: The Kyoto Protocol, 4
ENV'TL LAw 917 (1998); Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global
Warming, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 445 (1992); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Porcupine's Dilemma:
Strategic and Psychological Uncertainty in the Face of Global Warming, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 267 (1992).
9D EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIvERSrY OF LIFE 347 (1992). See also Eric Christensen, Note,
Genetic Ark: A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversity for Future Generations, 40 STAN. L. REV.
279, 279 (1987) ("[E]ach species contains invaluable genetic material which could provide
the key for monumental advances in both plant breeding programs and the fledgling
science of genetic engineering."); Babbitt, 130 F.3d at 1053 ("To allow even a single species
whose value is not currently apparent to become extinct therefore deprives the economy of
the option value of that species.").
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Biodiversity thus offers a certain "positive" payoff. Certainly, freedom
of speech, too, involves affirmative payoffs, as well as the sorts of risk-
reduction through diversity91 upon which this Article focuses herein.
Just as some forms of investment or business diversification may
entail certain risks,92 biodiversity may itself pose, at least indirectly,
certain risks of its own. While "numerous exotic plants have yielded life-
saving drugs," much of this sort of bounty is currently untapped and
difficult to estimate. This argument can admittedly be stood on its
head. 93  Just as there are risks from the possibility of accepting
potentially suppressible and currently unconceived bad ideas, there are
also risks that some currently protected biological species will eventually
unleash some hideous plague.94
The best response to this possibility is to agree that in both the
biological world and in the political world of speech, identifiable
plagues, and, indeed, the sheer transmission of recognizable disease,
should be suppressed.95 Plagues, along with hate speech, are at least as
likely to reduce overall biological diversity, or to reduce through
intimidation the overall diversity of speech, as to enhance it. Few species
carry any special plague threat, and even fewer forms of genuine idea
expression carry any analogous "plague" potential.
One should also not assume that currently unappealing biological
species and forms of speech are invariably without affirmative value.
For example, the South American pit viper, although harmful, offers
much value to our own species. Studies of the venom of one such
species actually led to a better understanding of the blood pressure
regulatory system in humans and to the development of a billion dollar
per year hypertension prescription drug.96 By analogy, much speech that
seems to those in power to be virulently toxic may, in the judgment of
91 See, e.g., the self-realization value discussed at supra note 12 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
'3 John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L REV. 1171,1208 (1998).
94 See id. at 1212.
95 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (discussing the penalty enhancement
statute only); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 133 (1982); R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUrURE
OF FREE SPEECH LAw 58 (1990).
96 See Thomas E. Lovejoy, Biodiversity: What Is It?, in BIODIvERsrIY H: UNDERSTANDING AND
PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 9 (Marjorie L Reaka-Kudla et al. eds., 1997).
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history, seem in some respects constructive and of some genuine value, if
not entirely justified.97
None of this implies that society should simply "freeze" ecosystems
as they currently stand, allowing no species to disappear if it can be
prevented, 98 or that society should somehow try to artificially preserve
into the future just the current range of perspectives on public issues,
and allowing as little dynamic change as possible. There is no point in
pretending that the sky will fall if a few species inadvertently perish, or
even perish as a result of deliberate human decision.99 Of course,
governments could also suppress a few quite specific ideas without
actual disaster ensuing, but this could hardly be treated as sufficient
grounds to permit any government to embrace such an option.
Current biodiversity policy under the Endangered Species Act is
generally not to "allow society to decide that one bird is more important
than another, or that we will save one animal but not another." 100
Society should, by analogy, view the rich diversity of ideas and ways of
living, across contemporary and historical cultures, as the genetic
material with which to fashion the best critiques of contemporary
practice.101 Of course, this is not to suggest that either governments or
private actors should treat all ideas and practices as of equal value.
Quite the opposite is true. It is through an evenhanded, creative,
continuing review of societies vast inventory of alternative possibilities
that one can most intelligently criticize the current arrangements.
IV. DIVERSITY OF PERSPECTIVE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
It has rightly been argued that "[jiust as diversity in the gene pool, in
the variability of life on earth, is necessary for our survival, so is cultural
diversity a great pool from which we can draw ideas and practices we
need to live by." 102 As a society, we at least profess to value diversity, of
97 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official libel case).
9 See Nagle, supra note 93, at 1215.
" See Nagle, supra note 93, at 1215; Perrings et al., supra note 86, at 5 ('[Ilt remains for
future research to fix the boundaries to sustainable [biodiversity] losses .... ).
1m Nagle, supra note 93, at 1172. But cf. id. (discussing the seven member committee
entrusted with decreeing exceptions).
101 Attention to past practices, in one's own or other societies, implies neither that one
thinks it desirable, nor that one thinks it possible, to restore unaltered, some previously
discarded institution. The past provides resources, not templates.
10 Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for
the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE UJ. 1329,1401 (1991).
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one sort or another, as a matter of public policy, 103 and particularly in
educational institutions,104 though the constitutional law of such a
valuation of diversity is at present controversial. 1s
103 See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (noting the FCC policy
of "promoting diversity in programming"). But cf. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v.
FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir 1998) ("The commission never defines exactly what it
means by 'diverse programming.' (Any real content-based definition of the term may well
give rise to enormous tensions with the First Amendment .... )"). Certainly the idea of
speech diversity itself, or of enhancing speech diversity, is not unconstitutionally biased
against any concrete viewpoint.
104 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Why Universities Are Morally Obligated to Strive For Diversity:
Restoring the Remedial Rationale For Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1165 (1997). A
quick tour of the admissions page websites of some high ranking law schools suggests
support for some forms of diversity. See, e.g., University of Wisconsin Law School,
Admissions Policy (last modified Apr. 21,1999)
<http://www.law.wisc.edu/admissions/policy.htm> (referring to "diverse skills, talents,
and interests" and to "students from diverse cultural, political, geographic, and socio-
economic backgrounds"); Boalt Hall, Background and Faculty Policy Governing Admission to
Boalt Hall (last modified Oct. 3,1999)
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/admissions/policy.shtml> (referring to "racially and
ethnically diverse student bodies"); Columbia Law School, Admission to the ID Program
(visited Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.law.columbia.edu/admissions/admsjd.html>
(referring to diversity of "background and interests"); Duke Law School, Applying
<http://www.law.duke.edu/admis/admissions.html> (last modified Sept. 9, 1999)
(referring to diversity in terms of "general background, geography and undergraduate
institutions represented," and especially "minorities who traditionally have not been well
represented in the legal profession").
10 The axis upon which much of the constitutional law of diversity turns continues to be
Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Justice Powell refers in particular to "the educational diversity valued by the First
Amendment." Id. at 316. For some doubts and disagreements as to the current status of
this opinion, see Hopuood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A]ny consideration of
race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is
not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d
720, 724 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, J., dissenting from failure to grant rehearing en banc)
("[W]e are firmly convinced that, until the Supreme Court expressly overrules Bakke,
student body diversity is a compelling governmental interest for the purposes of strict
scrutiny."); Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1563 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding
that "the benefits flowing from diversity in the educational context are significant indeed,"
but nevertheless rejecting the school board's plan); Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 136 (5th
Cir. 1997) (citing Hopwood as holding unconstitutional "the use of ethnic diversity simply to
achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of the consideration of a number of factors");
Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 221 (5th Cir. 1998) ("'Diversity'... is not a compelling state
interest that satisfies the strict scrutiny standard for the purpose of admissions at a public
university."); Ex Parte Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d 735, 739 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc)
(accusing Hopwood court of "ignoring precedent" of Bakke). For the Court's current level of
scrutiny in racial equal protection cases, see Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
22 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
If more than one kind of diversity is valued, it is important to
recognize the likelihood that not all forms of valued diversity will be
perfectly correlated, and that the various forms of valued diversity
cannot always be maximized simultaneously. The occasional need for
tradeoffs among valued forms of diversity cannot be ruled out.
However, it is at least equally important to recognize that, quite
typically, the forms of diversity that society most values will be mutually
reinforcing. The focus herein is on diversity of views as both
contributing toward and reflecting freedom of speech. Cultural diversity
is not merely some alternative sort of diversity with which one should
expect diversity of expression to clash. Valued forms of diversity, with
diversity of expression among them, will typically be mutually
supporting, or at least compatible.
The very idea of diversity of "perspective" is useful in emphasizing
the deep congruences between cultural diversity and diversity of speech
and expression. In the main, it should be expected that if cultural
diversity increases, given the increase in the number of cultural
perspectives represented, so should the range of views that may be
brought to bear on any given public issue. The idea of "viewpoint" links
the idea of views, which one seeks to diversify, and the idea of a
perspective, or the standpoint or point of view from which any given
problem may be perceived. The ideas of cultural diversity and of
diversity of expressible points of view are thus almost conceptually
inseparable.
This does not, of course, imply that any given culture is likely to
have a uniform, homogeneous point of view on any given subject. What,
one may futilely ask, would be the current uniform African-American
perspective on nineteenth century European opera? Wouldn't that
perspective depend, among other factors, upon whether one happens to
be a devotee of such music 06 or, perhaps, whether one has for a lifetime
simply been denied any realistic access to that music?1°7 Differences of
background, resources, and experience within groups, and the fact of
10 For merely a few examples, consider Marian Anderson, Leontyne Price, Shirley Verrett,
Grace Bumbry, Jessye Norman, Kathleen Battle, and Denyce Graves. It might be noted that
the number of leading African-American tenors in particular has historically been limited,
for reasons discussed in, for example, Roslyn M. Story, Survivor: Singer Thomas Young,
OPERA NEWS, Jan. 30,1993, at 28.
107 There are of course healthier reasons for differences of perspective within any cultural
group as well. Further, to at least some degree, everyone is a member of more than one
cultural group simultaneously.
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inevitable multiple group membership for everyone, also contribute to
the absence of monolithic cultural group perspectives.
It is important, though, to appreciate what this qualification does
and does not show. It does show that diversity of perspective is not
maximized by adding merely one or two representatives of any given
cultural group to an ongoing mix of established voices. The one or two
voices added in to represent that cultural group may not be typical, or
what is almost as harmful from a free speech standpoint, is that the
added voices may indeed be typical of that cultural group, thereby
underrepresenting the genuine diversity of perspective within that
group. This may leave others with a distorted, inaccurate, and narrow
understanding of the experiences of the cultural group in question.
Speaking merely for oneself can be challenging; speaking for all of one's
varied cohorts, with some of whom one disagrees, may be either
unappealing or impossible.
Diversity of perspective within any cultural group does not, on the
other hand, imply that group experiences cannot be formative, or that
experiences and perspectives cannot significantly vary by group. For
example, the historical African-American experience with police law
enforcement has been rich in its variety. The range of experiences,
perceptions, and views of African-Americans regarding police tactics,
however, do not simply mirror, and thereby confirm, those of whites.108
One need not, for purposes herein, come to some conclusion as to
how to maximize cultural diversity itself. Nevertheless, it is fair to ask
how one should take advantage of cultural diversity in such a way as to
optimize diversity of expression. One might, for example, argue that the
ideal of maximizing diversity of expression requires what might be
called maximum "uniform diversity" at the level of particular
institutions and organizations. Under such a uniform diversity model, it
would be ideal from the standpoint of diversity of expression if every
particular institution was diverse in as many important respects as
possible. Every individual organization would, ideally, look like
108 See, e.g., Joe H. Stroud, Simpson Trial Shows How Much Race Shapes What We See, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Oct. 8, 1995, at 2K; John Riley, Race and Deadly Force/Cops, Civil Rights: Shootings
Ignite a National Debate, NEWSDAY, March 14, 1999, at A05; Robert Polner, An All-Time
Low/Mayor's Approval Rating in Poll Dwindles to 40%, NEWSDAY, April 9, 1999, at A03; Tom
Topousis & Maggie Haberman, Rudy Job Rating Hits New Low; Bad News in Post-Diallo Poll,
N. Y. POST, April 9, 1999, at 2. For a key contribution to the related area of statistical
differences among races in jury service, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
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America, 109 and thus, in that respect, in a loose sense somewhat like
every other organization.110
Doubt may arise as to whether this form of cultural diversity
unmodified, would either maximize or optimize diversity of expression.
If every organization looked roughly like America-the face of the CEO
might well vary widely-there might, despite such variety arise, certain
commonalities of perspective that would be especially difficult to
recognize and challenge because of their very pervasiveness and
apparent naturalness. This might be a much improved and much
moderated version of the blinded vision of those historical institutions
that implicitly assumed that whiteness and maleness, for example, could
encompass all useful perspectives. Cultural diversity is not, in itself, the
sum of all possible social contexts.
Consider, for example, that if all organizations literally looked like
America, even with permutations among the leaders, there would be no
place for junior high schools, high schools, or universities solely for
women."' Can one be entirely sure that the availability of at least a few
women's schools, as an option, would not contribute to diversity of
expression, even indirectly or over the long term? The question is not
precisely of justice, equal protection, the educational efficacy of all-
women schools, or even the range of choices available to women.
Instead, it is whether even a few such all-women schools could
contribute to optimizing the mix of voices and perspectives in the public
discourse.
Im Recall that the Clinton Cabinet was touted as one that "looks like America." See Ruth
Marcus, Clinton's Recipe for Cabinet: A Blend of Convention and Activism, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
1992, at A01. For certain residual anomalies, see, for example, Terry Zaleman, Letters to the
Editor. What About Asian Americans?, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1993, at A18; Edward Walsh, The
Not So Rich; The Very Rich; A Cabinet That Looks Like America-To Their Accountants, WASH.
POST, Sept. 21, 1998, at A19.
110 Of course, the cultural or demographic dimension of authority within organizations
could still vary among organizations. Every cultural group could, at least by virtue of
random chance, presumably point to some organizations of which one of its members was,
say, president or CEO. In this respect, organizations would not look like one another.
M For discussion of related general issues, see Beth Lief, A Symposium on Finding a Path to
Gender Equality: Legal and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 1 (1997); Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: The Case for
Women's Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1998); Tara Boland, Comment, Single-Sex Public
Education: Equality Versus Choice, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 154 (1998); Amanda Elizabeth
Koman, Note, Urban, Single-Sex, Public Secondary Schools: Advancing Full Development of the
Talent and Capacities of America's Young Women, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (1998).
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At a minimum, it seems implausible to rule out this possibility.
However, if by saying that the availability of at least a few all-women
schools might optimally enrich the diversity of speech, does that not
thereby legitimize schools that stigmatize or exclude women? Would
this not amount to a free speech defense in the name of institutional
diversity as well for, say, the Virginia Military Institute's historic
exclusion of women?112
There is no reason to concede that if the existence of a few women-
only schools would optimize diversity of expression, then the existence
of a few men-only schools would have a similarly beneficial effect on
speech. Organizations of men and organizations of women need not be
symmetrical in this respect. They may not be similarly near, or similarly
distant, from the established center of cultural gravity on any particular
public issue. Men's and women's organizations may not equally
embody the already dominant cultural beliefs. Women's institutions in
our culture may tend to a greater degree to generate and promote
distinctive, non-dominant ideas. Men's institutions may, in contrast,
tend to express ideas that are already well-represented in public
discourse by other institutions.13
This is, at least, a possible difference between men-only and women-
only organizations with respect to enhancing the diversity of speech. It
is also at least possible, though less likely, that the existence of some
men-only organizations might also contribute to increasing diversity of
speech. If diversity of speech in such a case is a concern, then society
must reflect upon all the constitutional values at stake. One should
consider the marginal difference between the degree of diversity of
speech with and without the male-only organizations at issue. Any such
determination will to a degree be contestable and speculative. Care
should be taken to remember that a newly coeducational institution may
evoke new, unfamiliar ideas from both the men and the women affected.
112 For the decision overturning this system on equal protection grounds, and requiring an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for such discriminatory practices, see United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), which Virginia defended on the grounds of the value of
"diversity in educational approaches." Id. at 535. The Court observed that "Virginia has
not shown that VMI was established, or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying,
by its categorical exclusion of women, educational opportunities within the
Commonwealth." Id.
113 Of course, there may well be other differences between men-only and women-only
institutions for other constitutional purposes. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Cowan, Note,
Distinguishing Private Wonwn's Colleges from the VMI Decision, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
137 (1997).
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Society should, of course, take full account of the various constitutional
burdens imposed on women by male-only organizations.
Doubtless some forms and degrees of discrimination are beyond the
constitutional pale. In such cases, no reasonably anticipated additional
diversity of speech could outweigh the discrimination required to
generate that additional speech diversity. In closer, less egregious kinds
of cases, one may want to look more carefully at the actual burdens on
all parties, the range and value of alternatives realistically available to all
affected parties, the status and prestige levels of the institutions
involved, and the actual power relationships involved.
In particular, in a genuinely close case in which there may be a
conflict between diversity of speech and cultural diversity in some form,
the following factors in addition to the diversity of speech effects may
need to be considered: What is the actual nature and degree of burden
on the interests of any individual or group excluded or discriminated
against by the organizations in question? How many organizations are
threatening to impose such discrimination? What is their "market
share?" Where do the discriminating organizations stand in the relevant
hierarchies of social power and prestige? Do the discriminating
organizations function in any sense as gate-keeping institutions? How
many persons or groups look to the discriminating organizations for
leadership? Crucially, what realistic, practically available alternatives, of
what quality or prestige, remain available to those burdened by the
discrimination in question?114 Do the discriminating organizations hold
anything remotely like a geographical or other form of monopoly, or are
there obvious practical substitutes available of at least equal value, as
judged by the victims of discrimination? Are there any relevant
considerations of sheer financial cost to those victims? What,
realistically, will be their fate? Ultimately, of course, equal protection
rights in particular must be respected.
These considerations may help with the close cases in which some
form of diversity may cut against enhancing diversity of speech. They
114 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has been ambivalent about the constitutional relevance
of alternative channels of speech available to a speaker. See City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (finding that, as constitutionally relevant, the
restrictions on speech "do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication").
But cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place.").
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may also shed light on the cases that are not, as well. Part of the problem
in the United States v. Virginia15 case may have been that, for a number of
viable women candidates, there was little in the way of all-women or
coeducational military training otherwise available that would be both
practically accessible and of comparable value, quality, and prestige. In
short, the women denied access to VMI on the basis of gender may have
had few alternatives. This same set of considerations also suggests why
it is even more important that the presidential cabinet "look like
America" in some relevant respects, than the Board of Directors of some
single, small, obscure, local, private enterprise.116
Assume that, on the basis of all these sorts of considerations,
diversity of speech perspectives has been optimized. This does not by
itself guarantee that the general public, or the audience for speech, will
actually hear that optimal diversity of speech. Something of the
diversity of speech can be lost in the communication process, or in the
transmission of messages from speakers to potentially willing listeners.
Speakers may have diverse messages to convey without being able to
actually convey those messages. This problem has a number of
dimensions, including the wealth or poverty of potential speakers.117
Of special concern, however, is the issue of major media
concentration, and the possible ameliorative impact of increasing
Internet use. The fear is that as the conveyance of news, information,
and even entertainment devolves into fewer hands, the range and
115 518 U.S. 515 (1996). See also supra note 113 and accompanying text. This Article is again
merely assuming that, on the other side, a coeducational VMI somehow offers less
additional diversity of speech than a male-only VMI. This assumption is questionable,
given that both the men and women who experience a newly coeducational VMI may at
least for some time have ideas to express that are not generally available from other
sources. One thus might ask which contributes more to overall diversity of expression: the
condition of coeducation at VMI, along with both male and female reactions thereto, or the
contributions to continuing diversity of speech made possible only by a male-only VMI.
Once some conclusion is reached in this regard, other sorts of constitutional considerations
may then be applied.
116 Given that it is impossible for any relatively small group, including a presidential
Cabinet, to mirror America - after all, some Americans are under the age of thirty, are
disabled, or have been forced to drop out of high school or college - we must inevitably
make some sort of implicit value judgments about which sorts of perspectives would most
contribute to overall diversity of perspective and of speech within an organization. This
judgment must then be squared with all other relevant constitutional and non-
constitutional values, including sheer organizational effectiveness in carrying out any
assumed mission.
117 See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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diversity of ideas being successfully transmitted tends to be reduced,
thereby narrowing and impoverishing the range of ideas actually
received by and realistically available to the citizenry. This fear was
expressed half a century ago by Justice Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter
suggested that "[t]here are probably a lot more words written and
spoken in America today than ever before, and on more subjects, but if it
is true... that these words and ideas are flowing through fewer
channels, then our first freedom has been diminished, not enlarged." 1 8
As of a few years ago, the major television networks and a number
of other mass media conduits were controlled by four corporate entities:
General Electric, Westinghouse, Disney/Cap Cities, and Time Warner." 9
In such cases, one may be troubled by the limited numbers involved.
Beyond that, one may wonder, as with investment diversification
above, 120 whether the perspectives of, for example, General Electric and
Westinghouse are really negatively correlated in any relevant way.'2'
Their corporate response would, one might suspect, reflect what might
be called the Iron Law of Internally Perceived Diversity: every major
corporation and other significant .organization perceives itself as
(already) rich in internal diversity, regardless of which voices are absent
or muted, and as significantly different from other major organizations,
including its leading competitors. Thus, any concern that General
Electric and Westinghouse share important commonalities of perspective
may be rejected by insiders as a crude overgeneralization of their distinct
and diverse corporate cultures.'2
In reality, these enterprises do share basic commonalities of value
and perspective, whether they recognize those commonalities or not.
118 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,355(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting E.B.
White, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1946, at 97).
19 See Mark Crispin Miller, Free the Media, NATION, June 3,1996, at 9; see also, On that Chart,
NATION, June 3,1996, at 15 (James Fallows ed.) (accompanying joint discussion).
120 For a discussion of the analogy of investment diversification, see supra Section llI.A.
121 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
122 As a rhetorical question, one might ask, at another level, whether the current editorial
and news-judgment policies of the New York Times and Washington Post are more different
than alike. The same question might be posed of the New York Post and the Washington
Times. Do their perspectives correlate negatively? More disturbingly, it is also possible to
ask this question of, say, the New York Post and the New York Times, or, more generally, of
the slew of monthly popular magazines devoted to glamour, celebrity, lifestyle, fashion,
and entertainment. There is something of a common sensibility held by these magazines.
In particular, their advertising and content pages tout what we may call distinctively"consumptionist" approaches to life and its problems. See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING
WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 12-77 (1997).
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Their shared preference for consumptionist solutions of individual and
even community problems is one example. 123 The basic problem with
media conduits, from the standpoint of optimal speech diversity, is
really not one of market power, oligopoly, market share, or any
traditional antitrust concern.124 Four genuinely different media conduits
would be preferable to dozens of separately owned media conduits
whose basic values, assumptions, and motivations are, for all their
superficial variety, really quite similar. If those basic media values
reflect, and are reflected by, the values embraced by other vital cultural
institutions, the problem of limited free speech diversity becomes worse.
Will the technical advance and broadened accessibility of Internet
technology significantly reduce this problem of constrictive media
filtering? In the most optimistic mood, this seems possible. 125  Net
advocates talk of decentralization, individual and group empowerment,
interactivity, reduction of hierarchy, cost reductions, and even in some
respects, the abolition of scarcity.126 Can the Internet enable non-
mainstream speakers to become realistically accessible to a wide
audience?
There is much that might be said about freedom of speech and the
Internet. 127 It is possible that as the Internet develops, its effects on
freedom of speech will be mixed. One can imagine that the Internet and
successor technologies will allow for faster exposure of particular
provable lies committed by repressive governments. Photographs of a
fresh mass grave can be quickly published to the world, bypassing
censors. Responsive mainstream media may in turn republish those
photographs, amplifying the underlying message. Further, at a
minimum, even obscure groups and causes can have some sort of
Internet presence, and thereby reach at least some fragmentary audience.
It is also an overstatement to say that Internet empowerment will
typically involve individual and group self-absorption. At the very least,
123 See WRIGHT, supra note 122.
124 See Miller, supra note 119.
175 See, e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, New Voices in Cyberspace the Net Could Become a Vibrant
Alternative to the Media Oligopoly, NATION, June 8,1998, at 36.
12 See generally id.
12 See, WRIGHT, supra note 122, at 108-34; Floyd Abrams, First Amendment Postcards from the
Edge of Cyberspace, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 693 (1996); C. Edwin Baker, First
Amendment and the Internet: Will Free Speech Principles Applied to the Media Apply Here?, 11
ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 713 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE
L.J. 1743 (1995); Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995).
30 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
it is unlikely to be true that both the Internet promotes individual and
group narcissism, and that Internet news and information will just be
mainly an Internet version of familiar, mass-market, lowest common
denominator news reporting. On the other hand, it also seems unlikely
that the Internet will dramatically enhance popular interest in those
persons we consider remote from our interests. There are websites
devoted to African epidemics or mass starvation, but such sites are not
guaranteed a large actual audience.12 They must compete with a myriad
of other websites for our scarce attention, and they must compete given
our established values, interests, and priorities.
The most sophisticated Internet search engines do not increase the
number of hours in the day, or do much to revise values in a prosocial
direction. It is difficult to deny that the World Wide Web in particular is
moving inevitably in the direction of increasing commercialization, and
that commercial interests and commercial values are becoming
pervasive.129 Although we may wish to protect commercial speech on
the Internet, however, commercial values are not simply neutral values.
Less commercial values expressed on the Internet are likely to find
themselves subtly dissonant against an increasingly commercialized
background. In sum, it would be unrealistic to see the Internet asdissolving the problems normally faced by marginal voices seeking to
obtain a broad, serious hearing. The Internet does not ensure optimal
diversity of speech.
V. INCREASING THE DIERSITY OF SPEECH: SOME IMPORTANT EXAMPLES
A. Forbes and the Diversity of Electoral Speech
The Supreme Court values diversity of speech, at least until diversity
of speech is thought to come into conflict with some other free speech
value. The Court's rhetorical support for diversity of speech may then be
undercut by its substantive constitutional holdings. Perhaps the clearest
example of this gap between rhetoric and holding comes in the well-
known campaign finance case of Buckley v. Valeo.130 In Buckley, the Court
refers to the goal of "the widest possible dissemination of information
128 See, e.g., Southern Sudan: Testimonies of a Human Tragedy (visited April 17,1999)
<http://www.dwb.org/reports/ssudan.htm>.
129 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 122, at 108-34.
130 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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from diverse and antagonistic sources." 131 This language seems to value
diversity of perspective. On a more literal level though, it calls not for
wide diversity of perspective, but wide dissemination of ideas.132 It
seems to be more important for many people to be reached by speech
rather than having a wide diversity of voices doing the speaking.
This literal analysis of the Court's language may understate the
intended emphasis on protecting and enhancing diversity of perspective.
Nevertheless, it is clear, in the larger context, that Buckley's major theme
is not to exalt diversity of free speech perspectives. While the Court in
Buckley was badly fractured, the per curiam opinion maintained that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment." 133 Admittedly, restricting someone's speech
for the sake of enhancing someone else's does not always enhance
diversity of speech. A government might rob from the speech-poor to
give to the speech-rich, bringing the overall composition of public debate
even closer to a monologue. It seems evident, however, that the Buckley
per curiam opinion is unsympathetic to the idea of restricting anyone's
speech to not only enhance anyone else's speech, but also to increase the
genuine diversity of perspectives practically available for public
consideration.134 Typically, though, one should be able to think of many
ways of enhancing speech diversity without violating anyone's free
speech rights.135
131 Id. at 49 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957))).
13 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
13 Id. at 48-49.
134 The tenor of the per curiam opinion would tend to see a restriction of A's speech in
order to give B, C, D, and E for the first time a realistic opportunity to reach an audience as
a violation of A's protected free speech rights. In a different context, see Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998). Of course, there should ordinarily be a
number of ways of promoting greater diversity of speech, including equal general
subsidies, that do not significantly restrict anyone's speech. A government fund, for
example, that bought the same amount of newspaper or cyberspace ad space for "minor"
electoral candidates as for "major," much better financed candidates, could well have some
positive effect on diversity of speech without violating the speech rights of the well-
financed candidates.
Us See supra note 134. More fundamentally, public school curricula that provide basic
background on various cultures and classes also reduce the obstacles such cultures and
classes must face in intelligibly conveying otheiwise unfamiliar perspectives to the general
public.
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Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes3 6 illustrates how
increasing diversity of speech might work in another context. Forbes
involved the exclusion of an independent candidate from an Arkansas
congressional district candidates' debate sponsored and televised by a
state agency, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission. 137 The
Republican and Democratic candidates for the particular congressional
seat were invited to participate,13 8 but the plaintiff Ralph Forbes, an
independent ballot-qualified candidate, was excluded. 139 Forbes was a
minor, previously unsuccessful candidate with little popular support, at
least at the time of the debate.14
The Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of Forbes. 4 1 To reach this
result, the Court utilized the frequently murky, if not at points arbitrary,
public forum doctrine. 42 For purposes of this Article, however, the
crucial element of the Court's analysis was its weighing of the value of
free speech diversity against the value of the public broadcaster's scope
of editorial discretion, as a gatekeeper or filter, in granting or denying
speakers' access to the broad viewing public.143 This balancing process
came out in favor of the latter.
The Court concluded that "Congress ha[d] rejected the argument
that 'broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all
persons wishing to talk about public issues. ' " '" Such a view might be
termed the maximum diversity approach to broadcast access rights. Of
course, to enhance speech diversity, there may be no reason to require
that this be done through television broadcasting. It may be that speech
diversity can be better enhanced through media other than television
broadcasting. Nonetheless, something like an open access policy, at least
for public broadcasting stations, might well enhance the diversity of
M 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
137 Id. at 1637.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 1638.
140 Id. at 1637-38.
'4' Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
142 Id. at 1641-43. For discussion of the Court's use of the public forum doctrine in Forbes,
see R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity An Explanation of Why the Law Can't Just Be
Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000). For one recent example among
many of the sheer unmanageability, if not arbitrariness, of public forum doctrine, see the
majority and dissenting opinions in Warren v. Fairfax County, 169 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 1999).
14 Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1639-40.
144 Id. at 1639 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
105 (1973)).
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views and perspectives available to the public, whatever disadvantages
such a rule might involve.
In Forbes, the Court focused instead on the "freedom" of public and
private broadcasters. 145 The freedom of such broadcasters involves the
exercise of discretion and choice as to which speakers to present on
which subjects. 146  This freedom is, thus itself, a matter of the
broadcaster's own freedom of speech.147 To restrict the broadcaster's
editorial discretion would be to restrict the broadcaster's freedom of
speech.
Unfortunately, - though inevitably, the broadcaster's editorial
discretion is exercised largely through decisions to exclude or limit the
access of particular voices and perspectives to the broadcast media. To
exercise the freedom of editorial discretion is, largely, to reduce the
maximum potential diversity of broadcast voices to some lesser degree
of broadcast diversity. Public broadcaster speech is, therefore, in large
measure, a matter of the screening or exclusion of some of the otherwise
maximum potential diversity of voices.
Which is more important from the overall standpoint of free speech
itself: the freedom of the public broadcaster to screen some, but not all,
of the diversity of voices on one ground or another, or the value to the
speakers, to the viewers, and indirectly to the broader public, of
enhancing the diversity of views available through public broadcasting?
As seen above, there are a number of grounds, focusing on risk
reduction,148 for believing the latter to be particularly important.
There is no doubt that one should be sensitive to the unwieldiness of
a political debate with perhaps a dozen participants, mainstream or
obscure. A standard-format debate involving two to four candidates
may be more coherent, more comprehensible, and more illuminating to
most viewers than a debate with many more candidates. 149 The more
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 1639-40 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc.,515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) and Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636
(1994)).
'4 For a discussion of diversity in the context of speech, see supra Section II.
14 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643. If public broadcasting stations simply chose not to bother
with debates involving practically manageable numbers of candidates, they could
presumably be statutorily required to do so under Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
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familiar the ideas, the more quickly and understandably those ideas can
be conveyed to viewers. Less familiar and more diverse ideas, in a
standard debate format, might result in a confusing "cacophony" of
voices.ls ° There is thus a sense in which a multi-party standard format
debate "would result in less speech, not more." 151
There are, however, important limits to the Court's conclusion that a
greater amount of diverse speech is more confusing and unmanageable
and therefore less, or less valuable, speech. It is, for one thing, largely
self-reinforcing. The more exclusively one is exposed only to
mainstream views, the more confusing and counterintuitive a non-
mainstream view may seem. The narrower the range of ideas to which
one is exposed, the more unwieldy and confusing an exposure to an
expanded range of ideas will seem.
Certainly there is a sense in which a standard format debate, but
with dozens of speakers, would be considered unwieldy or less than
ideal from most viewer's standpoints. Nothing is sacred, however,
about the current standard debate formats. Those formats have
historically been changed and could be changed again.15 2 Similarly,
human nature itself does not rule out grasping and appreciating a real
diversity of expressed perspectives. One may currently find a real
pluralism of perspectives to be unmanageable. Significantly, though,
one would likely find equally unmanageable a debate format that
involved our standing in the rain, for as much as three hours, to hear
Lincoln and Douglas, even though we used to find this manageable.15 3
Of course, listening to Lincoln and Douglas involved listening to
only two familiar, mainstream perspectives. Nevertheless, is it really
much easier to listen to those two perspectives without interruption for
several hours than to listen, for a shorter time, or on separate occasions,
to more perspectives? Standard debate formats may simply reinforce
society's standard binary, dualistic approach to public issues. Why not
depart from that standard format? Why not critically examine more
perspectives, within manageable time frames, over a series of separate
393 (1969) (i[If present licensees should suddenly prove timorous, the Commission is not
powerless to insist that they give adequate and fair attention to public issues.").
150 Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
151 See id.
152 Note, for example, that the length of debates, and the extent of journalistic participation,
has historically varied.M53 See THE LINcotN-DoucLAs DEBATEs oF 1858 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965).
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programs? Is a possible increase in diversity of speech perspectives not
worth the cost of adopting a range of debate formats?
To conclude the brief discussion of this example in a spirit of
accommodation, a limited concession should be made. Excluding non-
mainstream candidates from televised debates certainly need not
amount to classic discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. 5 4 No reason
exists to suppose that the public television station agreed more with
some ideas expressed by the Republican and Democratic candidates than
with those expressed by Forbes. 55 Further, there is admittedly no
perfect correlation between the conventionality or unconventionality of'
one's views and one's standing in the public opinion polls.1-6 This does
not mean, however, that there is no relation between holding unpopular
or non-mainstream views on the one hand and one's lack of political
popularity or support, as a candidate, on the other; Unpopularity of
one's political views is commonly linked to one's political unpopularity.
One cannot reasonably conclude that excluding non-mainstream
candidates on whatever grounds does not also tend to exclude non-
mainstream ideas. The likely adverse effects on diversity of expression
are inescapable.
B. Southworth v. Grebe and Diversity of Student Speech on University
Campuses
Proper concern for speech diversity helps adjudicate cases in which
there are free speech interests on both sides of the case. A further
contemporary example is posed in Southworth v. Grebe'5' and several
other loosely similar cases.'58 Southworth dealt with mandatory payment
by public university students of a fee going directly to the student
I' See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643-44. For a discussion of speech restrictions on the basis of
viewpoint, see, for example, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding the flag
desecration statute unconstitutional).
155 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643-44.
1% See id. at 1644.
15 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.), petition for reh'g en banc denied, 157 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Rovner, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (March 29,
1999). Southworth drew prompt academic commentary. See Kari Thoe, Note, A Learning
Experience: Discovering the Balance Between Fees-Funded Public Fora and Compelled-Speech
Rights at American Universities, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1425 (1998).
' See, e.g., Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1999);
,Carroll v. Blinken, 42 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1994); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992);
Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir.
1983); Galda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982).
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government association and then, in part, to various qualifying private
student organizations that engage in a broad range of political activities,
including political speech from particular perspectives on a number of
subjects.'5
Such cases may, like the public television debate case, involve
legitimate free speech interests on both sides. It is not necessary to
minimize the possible free speech interests of the objecting students. At
least in some imaginable extreme cases, these free speech interests could
be significant. In such a case, it would not matter whether the
mandatory student fee assessment is called a classic instance of
compelled speech or not.16° Nor, in such a case, would it necessarily be
decisive that no portion of the assessed fee go directly and immediately
from the objecting student to the political group the student finds
objectionable. 161 Surely, for example, one would have some sympathy
for a Jewish student who must pay a portion of her fee, directly or
indirectly, to an anti-semitic group that managed to qualify under the
school's funding criteria. 162
This is not to suppose that reasonable persons would imagine that
any given student actually supports any or all of the qualifying student
M See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718-21.
1w Cf. Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1037-38 ("[T]his case does not present an instance of compelled
personal speech...."); Southworth, 157 F.3d at 1126 (Rovner, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc) (viewing student fees as supporting a broad forum for
varied speech, and noting that "[tiherefore, there is no issue of 'compelled speech' here").
For examples of classic compelled speech cases, see, for example, Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977) (involving the state motto uniformly required on passenger license plates);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (concerning a flag salute and
the pledge of allegiance).
161 Cf. Southworth, 157 F.3d at 1125 (Rovner, J., dissenting from denial of petition for
rehearing en banc) ("The complaining students are paying fees not to the challenged
groups, but to the student government, which then uses the money to fund its own
operations and over 100 student groups, regardless of viewpoint.").
162 It would admittedly be worse if the student's entire compulsory fee were devoted solely
to some particular group or viewpoint the student found to be profoundly objectionable,
but this is a matter of degree. The smaller the fee, and the more its symbolic and other
effects are "diluted" by its dispersion among various other groups, the better.
Nevertheless, reducing the size of the fee, filtering it through student government, and
increasing the number and variety of recipients, does not entirely eliminate the objecting,
student's speech interest. The objectionability of requiring a Jewish student to contribute
even indirectly, to an anti-semitic group, whatever the weight of that objectionability, is not
entirely erased by also requiring the student to contribute to groups with which she is
strongly sympathetic, or to a variety of other groups as well. One may note in passing the
somewhat different issues raised by the fact that public university tuition supports the
salaries of faculty members of varying and occasionally unpopular views.
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organizations merely because the student unprotestingly pays a required
activity fee. 16 The real free speech objection, from the standpoint of the
objecting student, is not one of being misunderstood, but of something
like a compelled loss of the student's integrity of world view. The
student's basic public value scheme is arguably being violated
unnecessarily. Whatever the weight of this speech interest, it is certainly
a legitimate consideration.
Free speech interests are, however, on the other side of the case as
well. The admittedly compelled student fee assessments amount to a
subsidy of the speech of various organizations. 164 While what counts as
a "subsidy" really depends upon a chosen baseline, this Article will
herein simply assume a conventional baseline in determining what will
qualify. Subsidies of speakers clearly tend to amplify the speakers'
voices and implicate the free speech clause.165 A subsidy of one, and
certainly of many, student organizations from a general fee assessment
need not amount to a zero-sum transfer in which the free speech gains to
the subsidized groups are fully counterbalanced by genuine, inescapable
losses in the ability of some or all of the subsidizing students to speak. It
is certainly possible that the subsidizing students would otherwise have
spent all or part of the relevant funds on items other than speech, and
that they would be more likely to spend the funds on non-speech
activities than the subsidized groups. Subsidies may thus increase
speech overall. Thus, free speech interests are on both sides of the case.
If free speech issues are indeed on both sides of this kind of case, one
should not expect to find the case outcome utterly obvious and entirely
uncontroversial. The crucial point is the quite substantial weight that
should be given to the public interest in a rich diversity of speech
perspectives, particularly on a state's major university campuses. The
number and diversity of subjects and speech perspectives represented by
the subsidized campus groups could well be large.166 There is certainly
163 This issue was raised in dissent in Wooley, 430 U.S. at 721-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist found no required advocacy or required affirmation of belief in Wooley,
given the very requiredness of the license plate and the possibility of disclaimer. Id.
164 For discussion of a number of important issues associated with governmentally
subsidized speech, see Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151 (1996).
165 See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) ("[T]he First
Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context...."); Hannegan v. Esquire,
Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 149 (1946) (finding that a post office may not deny subsidies on the
grounds that the content of a given periodical is contrary to the public welfare).
166 See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717,720 (7th Cir. 1998) (listing eighteen organizations,
ranging broadly as to subject matter, to whose funding the plaintiffs objected).
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no guarantee that at any point in history, the qualifying campus groups
will fairly and undistortedly represent the full spectrum of legitimate
opinion. Nevertheless, no state agency will generally be entitled to
discriminate among possible recipient groups on the basis of the group's
viewpoint.167
Actually, there is also no absolute guarantee that an offer to
subsidize the speech of student groups will elicit more speech, or allow
those groups to reach a broader audience, let alone encourage more
groups to come into existence. These effects certainly would, however,
be what one would ordinarily expect. Subsidies, after all, generally tend
to evoke more of the subsidized activity. 168
Thus, one reason for constitutionally favoring the mandatory fees is
that they can be said to expand the diversity of speech perspectives
expressed on public university campuses. Of course, this need not be the
only reason for favoring such fees. One could argue, a bit distinctly, that
hearing from an optimally broad range of perspectives should be
considered part of a major public university's broad educational
function. Just as a good education might require exposure to poetry or
statistics, so it could require exposure to many views on many subjects.
In any event, the value of a rich diversity of practically accessible
views on many subjects seems central. After all, with or without the
mandatory fees, there could still in a sense be "uncensored discussion
and debate" on public university campuses, even from a baseline of no
special fee subsidization.169 Student groups would still be allowed to
form and express their views otherwise unhindered by university
restrictions. Free speech value is seen, however, in even compulsory
subsidies of the student groups, as opposed to a more assumedly neutral
rule of neither taxing nor specially subsidizing such groups. This is
16 See, e.g., Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178-79; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447
(1991).
16M See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U.
CHi. L. REv. 497, 524 (1993) (supply of housing); Tom Kuhnle, Note, The Federal Income Tax
Implications of Water Transfers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 533, 557 (1995) (supply of water for
irrigation).
169 Thoe, supra note 157, at 1460. This is not to suggest that the absence of a 'subsidy' to
speech is genuinely natural and neutral, and that any 'subsidy' to speech is artificial and
distortive of what is natural. What counts as a subsidy or as a restriction may depend
upon one's selected baseline. See generally Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873 (1987).
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largely because subsidizing such groups, on a fair and equitable basis,
will lead to a desirable expansion in the diversity of accessible speech.
Typically, the value of the increased diversity of speech flowing from the
subsidy system will outweigh the free speech costs also attributable to
the compelled subsidy, including compelled speech or association. 170
VI. SOME OBJECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Consequently, the diversity of perspectives articulated and
practically available is crucially important, as a second-order value, to
freedom of speech. A broad diversity of speech typically pays off in
various ways, including as a social risk-reduction strategy akin to
diversification in the various other contexts, including investments and
biodiversity.""
This does not mean that every free speech case is, or should be,
about maximizing diversity of speech. A speaker from even a dominant,
well-represented perspective has a right against viewpoint-based
discrimination.172 While subordinated groups will normally benefit from
measures to increase speech diversity, it is also possible that the next
new voice will turn out to be that of a previously unknown hate
group.173 Thus, we cannot rightly resolve every possible free speech case
in favor of a generally unknown voice as against the government. Even
in such a case, however, whatever diversity hate speech might bring may
be restricted in order to protect and encourage the voices that have
historically been commonly marginalized. 174 Restricting hate speech can
easily be seen as promoting, rather than limiting, the effective diversity
of speech, given the potential of hate speech for intimidating other
speech.
Admittedly, other kinds of cases may arise in which it will be
unclear which of two possible case results best promotes diversity of
speech. Would it really promote diversity of political speech, for
example, for public schools to spend a class period each on every form of
monarchical and feudal regime, not as a matter of history, but as a
supposedly eligible option, at the cost of a more superficial treatment of
17u See Sunstein, supra note 169.
171 For a discussion of the many contexts of diversity, see supra Section 11I.
172 This is not to suggest that such a problem arises commonly; one would have to wonder
how dominant a view really was, at the relevant jurisdictional level, if it could not
legislatively prevent being discriminated against.
173 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
174 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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more realistic alternatives? Yet one can learn, opportunistically, even
from generally ineligible options. How should one weigh subsidizing
the third, fourth, or fifth most currently popular policy alternative
against adding a new ninth, and least popular option, to that list? Which
approach would best promote diversity? Will society always agree that
a given alternative should be ranked as less popular, or as less well
publicized, than another? This seems unlikely. Is diversity of thought
better promoted by encouraging only moderately popular, or the
currently least well publicized perspectives, or by encouraging the
expression of utterly new, as yet entirely unexpressed perspectives?
These sorts of problems are unavoidable. Others could be added.
Nevertheless, they really do not undermine the logic of enhancing free
speech diversity. Reasonable cases can be made for answering the above
types of questions in various ways. The best answers depend in part on
the time frame, short or long, in which one is most interested. The best
answers consistent with all of our relevant beliefs must simply be
chosen. These sorts of problems are certainly not unique to a diversity
focus, or even to approaches to freedom of speech. One can, for
example, value the idea of equality in various contexts. However, the
idea of equality is no more self-elaborating than the idea of diversity.
Inescapably, one must confront many varied questions about how to
define and measure equality."3 One can, and should, undertake a
similar task with respect to speech diversity.
To conclude, this Article responds briefly to an even more basic
concern. This Article has grounded the value of free speech diversity in
its usefulness in reducing serious social risks, and especially in the risks
of unrecognized and uncorrected political error, just as diversity in other
contexts reduces other sorts of risks.176 Fallibility in matters of political
judgment is a fact of life. Recognizing the risk of error in political
judgments should not lead to some form of extreme risk aversion or even
skepticism about making such judgments.1" Are there not many
political judgments in which one can have warranted confidence? Is it
175 See, e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1995); LARRY S. TEMKIN,
INEQUALITY (1993) (noting, inter alia, differences in approach to inequality at the levels of
averages, individuals, and groups, along with effects of population sizes, and other more
technical measurement problems). For a more skeptical view, see Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
176 See supra Sections H-IV.
7 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Tolerance, 74 IOWA L. REV. 761, 763-64
(1989).
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not possible to worry too much about the costs of mistaken and
uncorrected political judgments, or about all sorts of risks in general?1 8
It is certainly possible to spend too much in seeking to reduce any
particular risk. The biodiversification represented by, for example, the
snail darter may or may not be worth some necessary cost in economic
development or job creation.179 One might spend so much in hunting for
the last possible increment of diversification of an investment portfolio
that the spending on this quest exceeds any value the last scrap of
diversification might bring. One may overestimate the likelihood and
severity of particular risks,180 or alternatively, one may be unreasonably
fearful of risks more generally. There is a difference between prudence
and paranoia.
Seeking to reduce serious social risks through increased diversity of
speech need not be motivated, however, by any especially controversial
attitude toward risk. One need not take a distinctively conservative
attitude toward risk to see the "insurance" value of diversity of speech.
In particular, one can reasonably seek to expand diversity of speech, for
the sake of reducing the costs of avoiding or correcting political
misjudgments, without believing that the likelihood of the worst possible
political outcomes should always be minimized, at any cost.18'
There may be situations in which, for example, one could further
reduce the chances of some very serious political error, or of not being
able to correct that error quickly, but the only way to do this would itself
be costly. One might, in such a case, -face a choice between a strategy of
avoiding the most disastrous outcomes and of maximizing likely overall
welfare. 8 2 Certainly, it is not necessary to say that any additional
1" See Henry Fairlie, Fear of Living: America's Morbid Aversion to Risk, NEW REPUBUC, Jan. 23,
1989, at 14.
"9 For general discussion in the context of the Endangered Species Act, see TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978) and the Act as subsequently amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (e),(h) (1994).
18 For some classic discussions, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Daniel Kahnemanet et al. eds., 1982).
181 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-57 (1971) (endorsing a "maximin" choice
rule, under which the fate of the least well off group is to be heightened as much as
possible, even at significant costs in overall or average social well-being). Rawls, it should
be noted, endorses this risk aversive, "maximize the minimum payoff" rule only for certain
kinds of choices and contexts, and not universally. Id.
182 For a brief description of the strategy of maximizing expected utility, see, for example,
Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Within Reason, SCIENCE, May 4, 1990, at 559.
For brief, informal contrasts of expected utility maximization and maximin strategies, see,
for example, Richard Tuck, The Dangers of Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 683,
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reduction of any risk is worth paying any price.18 One need not believe
that any amount of further diversification and further risk reduction is
always worth any price in order to believe, rightly, that promoting
diversity of speech perspectives should be central to freedom of speech.
692 (1997); James W. Bowers, Whither what Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory,
and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 31 n.13 (1991);
Immaculado de Melo-Martin, Ethics and Uncertainty: In Vitro Fertilization and Risks to
Women's Health, 9 RisK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENv'T 201, 217-18 (1998).
18 For brief criticisms of risk-aversive maximin strategies compared to expected utility
maximization strategies, see, for example, Mayer G. Freed et al., Unions, Fairness, and the
Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL L. REV. 461, 497 (1983) (discussing maximin as
preferring a certain two dollar return on a one dollar investment to a 99% chance of a
million dollar return and a 1% chance of returning nothing, which would amount to the
worst possible outcome); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89
Nw. U. L. REv. 4, 6-7 (1994); Ralph M. Perhac, Jr., Does Risk Aversion Make a Case for
Conservativism?, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 297, 300 (1996). But cf. Jeffrey L.
Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573,598-99 (1983) (noting the popularity
of maximin strategies in insurance contexts, in which "[pleople typically are prepared to
pay an amount that is certain, and in excess of expected losses, in order to avoid the
possibility of incurring an even greater loss").
